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IMPROVING THE EFFICACY OF CITES BY
PROVIDING THE PROPER INCENTIVES TO
PROTECT ENDANGERED SPECIES
INTRODUCTION
Species have been vanishing and coming into existence since the
beginning of time. In the past few decades, however, the phenomenon of
escalating species extinction has entered the forefront of ecological
problems.1 Increased demand for wildlife coupled with increased human
intervention in the environment has brought about this threat to our natural
environs and to our very existence.2
Trade in wildlife is the world’s third largest illegal trade, behind drugs
and firearms, and is worth an estimated five to ten billion dollars a year.3 In
an effort to halt the pernicious effects of the illegal trade in endangered
species, multiple nations, in 1973, created the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”).4 CITES
entered into force on July 1, 1975, and currently includes 145 nations.5
CITES is arguably the most comprehensive international environmental
agreement. Over the last quarter century, CITES has regulated the wildlife
trade in the hopes of preserving the world’s precious species. The
1. Author Colin Tudge adeptly summarizes the escalating problem as follows:
In scale, . . . the mass extinction that we are now perpetuating is comparable with those of the past;
but in speed, the present turmoil far outstrips anything that has happened before. Because it is so
much faster, there is no time for animals to adapt; the option of surviving by evolving into
something else, which some creatures were able to do in the past, is not available. Because we
have interrupted the landscape, too, reducing plains and forests to sequestered pockets, we have
removed the option of migration, which in the past enabled many species to escape, for example,
the worst of the Ice Ages.
COLIN TUDGE, LAST ANIMALS AT THE ZOO 241 (1992).
2. When more than half of all medicines today can be traced to wild organisms, and chemicals
from plants are the sole or major ingredient in one-quarter of all prescriptions in the United States, the
need and reliance placed upon the world’s flora and fauna for human survival becomes painfully
obvious. See Endangered Species Coalition, The Endangered Species Act: a Commitment Worth
Keeping, in TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS ON CONTROVERSIAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 46, 50
(Theodore D. Golfarb ed., 1993).
3. See Julian Baum & Carl Goldstein, Asia’s Untamed Business, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 19,
1993, at 22, 23.
4. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
opened for signature Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 [hereinafter CITES].
5. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora: List
of Parties (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.wcmc.org.uk/CITES/english/parties2.htm>.
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methodology of CITES includes a balancing of ecological and economic
interests. Appendix I of the Convention lists the species most threatened with
extinction and completely bans the international commercial trade of these
species.6 Appendix II includes species threatened to a lesser extent and
allows these species to enter regulated commercial trade.7 Finally, Appendix
III includes any species that a party identifies as threatened within its borders
and “requires the cooperation of other parties in the control of trade.”8
Despite CITES’ seemingly flexible three-tiered approach to species
conservation, much debate in recent years has focused on the efficacy and
desirability of the Appendix I trade ban. Opponents of the trade ban point to
the Convention’s inability to protect some of the world’s most coveted
species. The elephant, the rhino, the tiger, and over forty species of parrots
are prime examples of CITES’ failed protection under its Appendix I trade
ban. Critics of the trade ban further note the multitude of enforcement
difficulties associated with the trade ban.
Two clashing ideologies have emerged from the debate. Leading western
nations, such as the United States, support the preservationist no-trade
ideology that sees trade as the ultimate evil. These nations look to improve
the trade ban through greater enforcement, funding, and education. Other
nations, led by the southern African nations of Zimbabwe, Botswana,
Malawi, Namibia, Zambia, and South Africa, advocate a conservationist
ideology that sees sustainable use trade as the ultimate protector of species
and habitat.9 These nations point to the success of their sustainable use
programs to conserve elephants, rhinos, and other animal populations. The
two ideologies clash during the listing decision whether to ban trade
completely under Appendix I or to allow regulated trade under Appendix II.
This clash is precisely the conflict that occurred at the most recent biennial
Conference of the Parties in 1997, where the southern African nations sought
to move the African elephant to Appendix II and succeeded in obtaining the
6. See CITES, supra note 4, 27 U.S.T. at 1092.
7. See id.
8. Id.
9. This Note uses the term “conservationism” and variations thereof to refer specifically to the
environmental approach opposite of preservationism. While some environmentalists refer to
“conservationism” and “preservationism” interchangeably, this Note will use the terms in opposition to
one another in order to refer to the two opposing ideologies. Conservationism implies using wildlife as
a resource whose “value can be reaped in the future as well as in the present.” Ike C. Sugg, Caught in
the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, Its Effects on Man and Prospects for Reform, 24
CUMB. L. REV. 1, 17 n.77 (1993). Such a notion goes to the heart of sustainable use. See id.
Preservationism, in contrast, is a denial of use. See id. “[P]reservation implies that what is should
remain so— unused, unmanaged and unvalued (if people are willing to pay only for use).” Id.
Preservationism suggests that a wildlife resource should not be used consumptively by humans— even
if such consumptive use were the most effective means of saving a species. See id.
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split-listing of the African elephant.10
This Note explores the ineffectiveness of CITES’ anti-use
preservationism to protect the world’s most endangered species and proposes
the exigency for CITES to adopt sustainable use alternatives as a viable
means of preserving species and habitat. Part I of this Note provides an
overview of CITES, focusing on its history, purposes, and provisions. Part II
analyzes the enforcement difficulties of CITES and the resulting inability to
protect highly coveted species. Part III examines why over-exploitation of
natural resources occurs and the relative merits of trade restrictions versus
sustainable use management to curb species loss. Part IV proposes that
CITES nations must recognize and implement sustainable use programs to
protect endangered species and habitat.
I. OVERVIEW OF CITES
A. History of CITES
The International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources drafted CITES in the late 1960s and early 1970s.11 Concluded in
March 1973, the Convention entered into force on July 1, 197512 and
comprised 21 member nations.13 CITES requires biennial Conference of the
Parties meetings where discussion and periodic revisions of the Convention
take place.14 To date, 145 nations are parties to CITES and share the common
goal of preserving endangered species through the regulation of international
trade in wildlife.15
10. See Summary Report on the 1997 CITES Conference (visited Mar. 18, 1999)
<http://www.worldwildlife.org/new/traffic/aug97/cites.htm>. Split-listing refers to placing the
elephant populations of the southern African nations with sustainable use programs on Appendix II,
while maintaining all other elephant populations on Appendix I.
11. See DAVID S. FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES: A GUIDE TO CITES
257 (1989).
12. See CITES, supra note 4, 27 U.S.T. at 1087.
13. See Shennie Patel, The Convention on Trade in Endangered Species: Enforcement and the
Last Unicorn, 18 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 157, 161 (1995).
14. See CITES, supra note 4, 27 U.S.T. at 1104. Ten Conferences of the Parties have been
convened since the inception of CITES and are listed as follows: Berne, Switzerland, November 1976;
San Jose, Costa Rica, March 1979; New Delhi, India, February 1981; Gaborone, Botswana, April
1983; Buenos Aires, Argentina, April 1985; Ottawa, Canada, July 1987; Lausanne, Switzerland,
October 1989; Kyoto, Japan, March 1992; Fort Lauderdale, United States of America, November
1994; Harare, Zimbabwe, June 1997. See The Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species: Conference of the Parties (visited Mar. 16, 1999) <http://www.wcmc.org.uk/CITES/
english/ecop.htm>.
15. The current member nations of CITES are as follows, in order of joining CITES: United
States of America, Nigeria, Switzerland, Tunisia, Sweden, Cyprus, Ecuador, Chile, Uruguay, Canada,
Mauritius, Nepal, Peru, Costa Rica, South Africa, Brazil, Madagascar, Niger, Morocco, Ghana, Papua
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B. Purpose of CITES
CITES’ ideology appears in the Convention’s preamble as follows:
The Contracting States,
RECOGNIZING that wild fauna and flora in their many beautiful
and varied forms are an irreplaceable part of the natural systems of the
earth which must be protected for this and the generations to come;
CONSCIOUS of the ever-growing value of wild fauna and flora
from aesthetic, scientific, cultural, recreational and economic points of
view;
RECOGNIZING that peoples and states are and should be the best
protectors of their own wild fauna and flora;
RECOGNIZING, in addition, that international cooperation is
essential for the protection of certain species of wild fauna and flora
against over-exploitation through international trade;
CONVINCED of the urgency of taking appropriate measures to
this end.16
CITES seeks to protect endangered species from over-exploitation
resulting from the international trade in wildlife. The preamble, however,
reveals that the Convention’s purpose attempts to strike a balance between
species preservation and the competing economic and recreational demands
placed upon wildlife. Paragraph one of the preamble suggests a
preservationist approach: that species should be protected for their aesthetic
New Guinea, Germany, Pakistan, Finland, India, Zaire, Norway, Australia, United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, Iran, Paraguay, Seychelles, Guyana, Denmark, Senegal, Nicaragua,
Gambia, Malaysia, Venezuela, Botswana, Egypt, Monaco, France, Panama, Togo, Kenya, Jordan,
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Bahamas, Bolivia, Italy, Guatemala, Tanzania, Liechtenstein, Israel, Japan,
Central African Republic, Rwanda, Suriname, Zambia, Portugal, China, Argentina, Liberia,
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, Belize, Philippines, Colombia, Guinea, Bangladesh, Austria,
Malawi, Sudan, Saint Lucia, Thailand, Congo, Belgium, Algeria, Luxembourg, Trinidad, Benin,
Netherlands, Honduras, Hungary, Afghanistan, Somalia, Spain, Singapore, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Burundi, Saint Vincent, Chad, Gabon, Ethiopia, Malta, New Zealand, Vanuatu, Burkina
Faso, Poland, United Arab Emirates, Cuba, Brunei Darussalam, Guinea-Bissau, Namibia, Bulgaria,
Mexico, Uganda, Russian Federation, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Slovakia, Czech Republic,
Greece, Barbados, Republic of Korea, Vietnam, Saint Kitts & Nevis, Mali, Romania, Eritrea, Sierra
Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Comoros, Dominica, Belarus, Mongolia, Saudi Arabia, Georgia, Turkey, Latvia,
Swaziland, Jamaica, Yemen, Myanmar, Cambodia, Antigua and Barbuda, Uzbekistan, Fiji,
Mauritania, and Azerbaijan. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora: List of Parties, supra note 5.
16. See CITES, supra note 4, 27 U.S.T. at 1090.
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and ecological importance.17 Paragraphs three and four suggest a
conservationist approach: that the protection of species relies upon the efforts
of individual peoples and nations in cooperation with the international
community.18 Paragraph two merges the preservationist and conservationist
approaches as it suggests a balancing of ecological concerns and economic
interests.19
The provisions of CITES further reveal a balancing of the competing
ideologies. Species listed in Appendix I of the Convention are completely
banned from commercial trade.20 Appendix I embodies the preservationist
notion that trade is the foremost threat to an endangered species’ continued
existence, and that eliminating the trade will preserve the species.
Conversely, species listed in Appendix II are permitted to enter commercial
trade as long as such trade complies with the regulations of the Convention.21
Appendix II, therefore, adopts the conservationist approach by allowing a
sustainable level of commercial trade in endangered species.
C. Provisions of CITES
CITES groups species threatened with extinction into one of three
appendices.22 The three levels of protection correlate to the imminence of
extinction for a given species.23 Appendix I includes “all species threatened
with extinction which are or may be affected by trade.”24 Trade in Appendix
I species is “subject to particularly strict regulation.”25 Appendix I species are
prohibited from commercial trade and can be traded non-commercially only
if both the importing and exporting nations satisfy several strict requirements
for the issuance of import and export permits.26
17. See Catharine L. Krieps, Comment, Sustainable Use of Endangered Species Under CITES: Is
It a Sustainable Alternative?, 17 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 461, 469 (1996).
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 22-26.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 27-29.
22. See CITES, supra note 4, 27 U.S.T. at 1092.
23. See id. See generally Michael J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF
NATURAL WILDLIFE LAW 495-96 (1977) (stating that the three levels of protection correspond to the
vulnerability of the species).
24. CITES, supra note 4, 27 U.S.T. at 1092. Included in Appendix I are “all rhinos, sea turtles,
great apes, great whales, most large cats, and over 600 other endangered species.” SARAH
FITZGERALD, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE TRADE: WHOSE BUSINESS IS IT? 321 (1989).
25. CITES, supra note 4, 27 U.S.T. at 1092.
26. See id. at 1093. The Scientific Authorities of both nations to the trade transaction must first
indicate that the trade “will not prove detrimental to the survival of the species.” Id. An export permit
further requires the Management Authority’s approval that the traded “specimen was not obtained in
contravention of the laws of that State,” and that the living specimen will be “prepared and shipped as
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Appendix II includes “all species which although not necessarily now
threatened with extinction may become so unless trade in specimens of such
species is subject to strict regulation in order to avoid utilization incompatible
with their survival.”27 In contrast to Appendix I, Appendix II species may be
traded for commercial purposes provided that the species was obtained
legally in the export State and “such export will not be detrimental to the
survival of that species.”28 Appendix II further provides for the regulation of
species similar in appearance to other threatened species in order to
effectively control the trade of the threatened species.29
Appendix III includes all species that any member nation identifies as
threatened within its borders and requires the “cooperation of other parties in
the control of trade.”30 The purpose of Appendix III is to facilitate a party’s
regulation of native species by requiring export permits from the listing
country and a “certificate of origin when the specimen is exported from other
countries.”31
Listing a species in its proper appendix is fundamental to the
effectiveness of the CITES. Unfortunately, the Convention, as written, failed
to outline specific guidelines for the listing and down-listing of species. At
the First Conference of the Parties, held in Berne, Switzerland, in 1976, the
parties established a set of listing criteria known as the Berne Criteria.32 The
Berne Criteria, however, provided only a rough guide to listing and suffered
to minimize the risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.” Id. The Scientific Authority of the
importing nation must be satisfied that the “proposed recipient of a living specimen is suitably
equipped to house and care for it,” and that the “specimen is not to be used for primarily commercial
purposes.” Id. at 1093-94.
27. Id. at 1092. Appendix II includes more than 2,300 animal species and over 24,000 plant
species. See FITZGERALD, supra note 24, at 322.
28. CITES, supra note 4, 27 U.S.T. at 1095. Unlike Appendix I, Appendix II only requires an
export permit. See id.
29. See id. at 1092. This provision prevents wildlife traders from illegally circumventing
Appendix II by marking threatened species as non-threatened look-alike species. “Appendix II covers
all parrots, cats, crocodilians, boas, orchids, and cacti not already listed on Appendix I. This helps
custom officers know that any shipments containing these species should be checked. Of the 24,000-
plus plants on Appendix II, over 20,000 are orchid species, and 1,500 are cacti. Most of these are listed
for look-alike reasons.” FITZGERALD, supra note 24, at 322. (citation omitted).
30. CITES, supra note 4, 27 U.S.T. at 1092.
31. FITZGERALD, supra note 24, at 322. “Canada, for example, lists the walrus in Appendix III
because the government regulates trade in the species and wants other countries to refuse imports of
walrus from Canada unless they have proper export permits.” Id.
32. See John L. Garrison, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Debate Over Sustainable Use, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 301, 312
(1994). The “Berne Criteria” refer to the following two separate resolutions passed by the parties:
Conf. 1.1, Criteria for the Addition of Species and Other Taxa to Appendices I and II and for the
Transfer of Species and Other Taxa from Appendix II to Appendix I; Conf. 1.2, Criteria for the
Deletion of Species and Other Taxa From Appendix I and Appendix II. See id. at 306 n.13.
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from indefiniteness and vagueness.33 Several southern African nations were
dissatisfied with the unscientific basis for listing decisions and began a push
for the adoption of new listing criteria at the 1992 Conference of the Parties
in Kyoto, Japan.34 The southern African nations did not succeed in their 1992
bid, but did succeed finally in passing the Fort Lauderdale Criteria at the
1994 Conference of the Parties in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.35 The Fort
Lauderdale criteria brought greater clarity and objectivity to the listing
process by establishing numerical standards for the listing of species.36 The
new criteria tie listing to scientific data rather than to the sympathies of the
parties. Consequently, proponents of sustainable use management view the
Fort Lauderdale Criteria as a success.37
Using the Fort Lauderdale Criteria as a guide, the parties may add and
remove species from Appendix I or II by a two-thirds majority vote of the
parties attending the biennial conference.38 In addition, CITES allows a party
to take a “reservation” with respect to any species listed in the three
appendices.39 A “reservation” effectively exempts the nation from the
Convention’s regulation of that species.40 The nation then is free to trade with
nonparty countries or with member parties claiming the same reservation.41
The reservation provision was intended to protect nations whose industries
33. See Kevin Eldridge, Recent Development, Whale for Sale?: New Developments in the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 24 GA. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 549, 559 (1995).
34. See id. at 559 n.54. The southern African nations comprised Botswana, Malawi, Zambia,
Zimbabwe, and South Africa. See id. at n.54. These nations’ strong disapproval of the Berne Criteria
grew out of the movement of the African elephant from Appendix II to Appendix I in 1989. See id. See
also infra text accompanying notes 142-43.
35. See Eldrige, supra note 33, at 559-60. The Fort Lauderdale Criteria was adopted in
Resolution Conf. 9.24, Criteria for Amendment of Appendices I and II. For a copy of Conf. 9.24, see
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (visited Mar. 18,
1999) <http://www.wcmc.org.uk/CITES/english/ eresol921.htm#924>.
36. See Eldridge, supra note 33, at 560. In Annex 5 of the resolution Conf. 9.24, the Fort
Lauderdale Criteria provide in part, the following numerical standards:
[A] species should be placed on Appendix I when one of the following requirements is met or is
likely to be met within five years: (a) a species’ area of distribution is less than 10,000 square
kilometers; (b) the population of a species is less than 5,000 mature individuals, or when a
geographically distinct group in the population (a sub-population) drops below 500 mature
individuals; or (c) a species’ population decreases by at least 50% within five years or two
generations, whichever is longer.
Eldridge, supra note 33, at 560 n.58.
37. See id. at 560.
38. See CITES, supra note 4, art. XV, para. 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1110.
39. See id. art. XXIII, 27 U.S.T. at 1116. Any party may take such “reservation” upon joining
CITES or upon amendment of the appendices concerning that species. See id.
40. See id.
41. See FAVRE, supra note 11, at 323.
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relied heavily on certain wildlife trade.42 The provision, however, creates a
significant loophole that can frustrate the efficacy of an Appendix I trade
ban.43
Like many international agreements, CITES relies on the individual
parties for enforcement. Each country is responsible for implementing and
enforcing national legislation in accordance with CITES.44 In addition, the
Convention requires each party to establish Management and Scientific
Authorities responsible for granting export, re-export, and import permits as
required by CITES’ provisions.45 The Scientific Authority plays a substantial
role in implementing CITES because it must determine when the export of
any species “should be limited in order to maintain that species throughout its
range at a level consistent with its role in the ecosystem in which it occurs
and well above the level at which that species might become eligible for
inclusion in Appendix I.”46 In practice, establishing an effective Scientific
Authority requires significant funding and thus, proves exceptionally difficult
for lesser developed countries to implement.47
II. DEFICIENCIES OF CITES
A. Enforcement Problems with CITES
As one might expect, an international environmental agreement with 145
signatory nations faces a number of enforcement difficulties. The first major
obstacle to effective enforcement of the Convention is the pervasive
inadequacy of national legislation. Article VIII establishes that each member
nation is responsible for enforcement of the Convention’s provisions within
42. See id.
43. See id. at 323-24. For a discussion of laundered elephant tusks, see RAYMOND BONNER, AT
THE HAND OF MAN 96 (1993).
44. See CITES, supra note 4, art. VIII, 27 U.S.T. at 1101.
1. The Parties shall take appropriate measures to enforce the provisions of the present Convention
and to prohibit trade in specimens in violation thereof. These shall include measures:
(a) to penalize trade in, or possession of, such specimens, or both; and
(b) to provide for the confiscation or return to the State of export of such specimens.
Id. art. VIII, para. 1 at 1101. Essentially, CITES mandates that member countries “police their own
ports of entry and exit, report on trade, and punish violators.” FITZGERALD, supra note 24, at 15.
CITES, however, has an administrative body, the CITES Secretariat, that “is responsible for
monitoring its implementation and can bring international pressure to bear on violators by reviewing
their infractions and highlighting other compliance problems.” Id.
45. See CITES, supra note 4, art. IX, 27 U.S.T. at 1103.
46. Id. art. IV, para. 3, 27 U.S.T. at 1095.
47. See John B. Heppes & Eric J. McFadden, The Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora: Improving the Prospects for Preserving Our Biological
Heritage, 5 B.U. INT’L L.J. 229, 238 (1987).
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the nation’s borders.48 Thus, the effectiveness of the overall Convention is
determined by the level of national legislation enforcing the Convention’s
provisions.49 When one considers the difficulty encountered by the United
States in maintaining adequate funding, personnel, and training to conduct
inspections of international shipments, it is no wonder that lesser-developed
nations experience infinitely greater difficulties in enforcing the
Convention.50 The second great obstacle to the enforcement of CITES lies in
the ineffective communication between the member nations.51 One
communication problem is the inadequate reporting of international wildlife
transactions.52 When the parties fail to submit accurate and detailed reports of
wildlife transactions, the Secretariat cannot monitor the level of compliance
with the Convention.53 Another significant communication problem is the
wide variance in each country’s national laws enforcing the Convention.54
Because each party is responsible for its own enforcement of CITES55,
national laws differ drastically in their procedures and substantive penalties
for noncompliance.56 The resulting confusion and procedural loopholes
ultimately lead to the illegal circumvention of CITES.
B. CITES’ Inability to Protect Highly Coveted Appendix I Species
While the growing membership and support of CITES largely has been
viewed as a great triumph toward the international preservation of
48. See CITES, supra note 4, 27 U.S.T. at 1101.
49. See Patel, supra note 13, at 187. At the Ninth Conference of the Parties in November 1994,
the Secretariat revealed that 27 out of 81 member nations surveyed had severely inadequate national
legislation. See id. at 186 n.191. Moreover, only 15 of the 81 nations surveyed met CITES
requirements for implementation. See id.
50. See Heppes & McFadden, supra note 47, at 237-40. See also Meena Alagappan, Comment,
The United States’ Enforcement of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora, 10 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 541 (1990) (discussing the difficulties and
deficiencies of the United States’ enforcement of CITES). As of 1989, the United States only staffed
“60 specially trained port inspectors to check the 90,000-plus shipments of wildlife and wildlife
products that enter and leave the country annually, an overload that enables many illicit items to slip
through.” FITZGERALD, supra note 24, at 23.
51. See Patel, supra note 13, at 188-89.
52. See id.
53. See id. Such reports would greatly aid the assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the
Convention. See id.
54. See id.
55. See supra text accompanying note 44.
56. See Patel, supra note 13, at 188. The lack of uniformity in national legislation inevitably
leads to noncompliance with CITES as “wildlife officials are unable to distinguish between procedural
compliance and illegal circumvention.” Id. A prime example of illegal circumvention occurs when the
illegal trade of a product is shifted from a country imposing severe penalties to another country with
less severe or non-existent penalties for the same activity. See id.
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endangered wildlife, beneath the surface lies the Convention’s disturbing
inability to protect some of the world’s most coveted and endearing species.
The elephant, the rhino, the tiger, and over forty species of parrots have
experienced precipitous declines in numbers despite receiving maximum
protection under Appendix I. CITES’ inability to protect these species
through its trade ban directly calls into question the efficacy of its command-
and-control prescription for saving endangered species.
1. The African Elephant
The fate of the elephant over the last quarter century is surely one of the
most publicized and tragic events in wildlife protection.57 In 1979, an
estimated 1,300,000 African elephants roamed free; by 1989 the number fell
to 609,000.58 In response to the sharp decline in elephant populations,
57. For recent articles discussing the plight of the African elephant despite CITES protection, see
generally John L. Garrison, Comment, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Debate Over Sustainable Use, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 301
(1994); Andrew J. Heimert, Note, How the Elephant Lost His Tusks, 104 YALE L.J. 1473 (1995); and
Bill Padgett, Note, The African Elephant, Africa, and CITES: The Next Step, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 529 (1995).
58. See David Concar & Mary Cole, Conservation and the Ivory Tower, NEW SCIENTIST, Feb.
29, 1992, at 29, 30. Other statistics reveal that from 1979 to 1989, Central Africa’s elephant
populations dropped from 497,400 to 274,800 and East Africa’s from 546,650 to 154,720. See Randy
T. Simmons & Urs P. Kreuter, Herd Mentality: Banning Ivory Sales Is No Way to Save the Elephant,
POL’Y REV., Fall 1989, at 46. In Kenya alone, despite the ban on elephant hunting, the elephant
population fell from 65,000 in 1979 to 19,000 in 1989. See id. These statistics revealed that “[h]alf of
the continent’s elephants were being killed every eight to ten years, and the losses in East Africa
reached 17 percent per year.” JONATHAN S. ADAMS & THOMAS O. MCSHANE, THE MYTH OF WILD
AFRICA 63 (1992). During this 10 year interval, the price of ivory increased fivefold due in great part
to the increased demand for ivory from the strengthened Japanese economy. See id. at 62.
“Middlemen, mostly based in Hong Kong, paid Africans only 10 to 30 percent of the price for raw
ivory; even so, the money— a fortune in most of rural Africa— provided a tremendous incentive to
hunt elephants.” Id. In fact, during the 1980s, the amount of ivory leaving Africa annually grew to
about 900 metric tons— a figure vastly in excess of the approximately 200 metric tons leaving Africa
annually during the 1950s. See id. at 63. As more and more large, male elephants were killed for their
larger tusks, the “tusks being exported became smaller and smaller, meaning that increasing numbers
of younger elephants had to be killed to supply the same amount of ivory.” Id.
It is also important to mention that the veracity of both the 1979 and 1989 census figures for the
African elephant rests on very rough approximations. See id. at 71. “Elephants . . . inhabit such a vast
area that making an accurate count is economically and technically impossible. Any estimate of the
number of elephants in Africa is no more than a guess.” Id. at 71. In addition, authors Adams and
McShane point out that elephant census figures are “magnets for money” for environmental
management programs and groups. See id. “The elephants’ doom is money in these groups’ pockets.”
Id. at 76. Thus, the lure of money from censuses tends to overestimate decreases in elephant
populations, and underestimate increases in populations. See id. at 71. A prime example of the import
attached to inexact census data occurred in Malawi after the 1989 census data were released. During
the 1989 census, one of the census takers consistently erred in his aerial counting and overestimated
the number of elephants in Malawi’s Kasungu National Park by nearly 1,500 elephants. See id. at 75.
The 1979 census data published a figure of 4,000 to 4,500 elephants for Malawi. See id. The error was
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CITES, in 1989, moved the African elephant from Appendix II to Appendix
I.59 Despite the Appendix I ban on international trade in ivory, the demand
for ivory continues to be met by the black market traffic in ivory.60 The two
primary threats to the elephant’s continued existence are poaching and
habitat destruction.61
2. The Rhino
The fate of the rhino is perhaps the single greatest tragedy under CITES.
There are two species of rhino native to Africa— the black rhino, a shrub
browser, and the white rhino, a grasslands grazer.62 While 100,000 black
rhinos roamed the African savannas in 1960, fewer than 2,500 exist today.63
The white rhino, traditionally the rarer species, has fared slightly better than
the black rhino. In 1920, the southern subspecies totaled only 60, but
currently has rebounded to nearly 7,000.64 The northern subspecies totaled
1,000 in 1960, and dropped to just 16 by 1984.65 Currently the northern white
rhino population is estimated at 30.66 All rhino species have been listed in
Appendix I since 1977.67 The maximum protection of Appendix I, however,
has failed to “arrest the decline of rhinoceros populations.”68 For example,
discovered and published in scientific literature in 1987, but this did not stop environmentalists from
proclaiming that Malawi’s elephant population had suffered a devastating loss of 50% of its elephants
when the corrected 1989 figure of 2,300 elephants was reported. See id. An article even appeared in
Time magazine, attributing the decline to increased poaching. See id.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 132-41.
60. Since the move to Appendix I in 1989, nearly 100 tons of ivory have been seized. See
Sustainable Arguments, ECONOMIST, June 21, 1997, at 83. See also Still in Business: the Ivory Trade
in Asia, Seven Years After the CITES Ban (visited Mar. 18, 1999) <http://www.traffic.org/publications/
summaries/summary_ ivorytrade.html>.
61. See BONNER, supra note 43, at 91. The seemingly divergent threats of poaching and habitat
destruction actually are quite related to each other. An adult elephant eats as much as 300 pounds of
food per day, which requires, in a dry climate, a range of up to 1,000 square miles. See ADAMS &
MCSHANE, supra note 58, at 79. As the population of African peoples increases along with their
increased reliance on the cultivation of land, African people often compete with elephants for scarce
natural resources. As a result, Africans many times resort to poaching elephants in order to protect
their crops from encroaching elephant herds. See Pest Control: Jumbo Problems, ECONOMIST, Mar.
15, 1997, at 83.
62. See Donna Rosenthal, Showdown in Zimbabwe: In the Nation That Once Held Africa’s
Greatest Concentration of Black Rhinos, Private Citizens Struggle to Save the Last of the Animals,
INT’L WILDLIFE, Nov.-Dec. 1996, at 28.
63. See id.
64. See id. The increase in the southern subspecies of white rhino is largely attributable to the
conservation efforts of South Africa. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See Rhino Progress? The Response to CITES Resolution Conf. 9.14 (visited Mar. 18, 1999)
<http://www.traffic.org/ publications/summaries/summary_rhino.html>.
68. See id.
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the world’s black rhino population suffered more than a 95 percent decline
from 1970 to 1993.69 No more than 12,500 rhinos exist in the wild today,
with 80 percent found in Africa.70
Poaching is responsible for the devastation to rhino populations. Rhino
horn is a prized commodity in traditional medicinal markets of the Far East.71
Chinese folklore, dating back more than 2,000 years, values powdered rhino
horn as an aphrodisiac72 and as a treatment for such ailments as high fevers,
convulsions, and failing vision.73 In addition, markets centered in North
Yemen demand rhino horn to craft ornate dagger handles symbolizing
masculine powers.74
3. The Tiger
The tiger, too, has not fared well despite maximum protection under
CITES.75 Two hundred years ago eight subspecies of tigers spanned across
Asia, Eastern Europe, and the islands of Bali and Java.76 Today the Caspian
tiger of Central Asia and the Javan and Balinese tigers are extinct.77 The
World Wide Fund for Nature estimates that only 5,100 to 7,500 tigers remain
today— a 95 percent decrease since the beginning of the century.78 The tiger,
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See FITZGERALD, supra note 24, at 24. The value of rhino horn on the black market is
estimated at $8,000 per pound, making the average rhino horn (10 pounds) worth about $80,000. See
Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 58, at 48. A typical poacher can make as much as $500 for killing a
rhino; an amount that exceeds many Africans yearly income. See Liz Sly, Poaching Ban Reconsidered
as Rhinos Flirt with Extinction, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Nov. 24, 1994, at A30.
72. See Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 58, at 48.
73. See Rosenthal, supra note 62. Other parts of the rhino are also used in traditional Chinese
medicine. For example, “rhino toenail is used to reduce fever, blood is used as a tonic, and the hide is
believed to cure skin ailments.” Christine Crawford, Note, Conflicts Between the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species and the GATT in Light of Actions to Halt the Rhinoceros
and Tiger Trade, 7 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 555, 561 (1995).
74. See Rosenthal, supra note 62. The illegal trade of rhino into North Yemen peaked during the
late 1980s when the Middle East enjoyed great oil profits. See id. Increased North Yemeni
enforcement of the trade ban combined with decreasing oil profits has reduced the market for rhino-
horn daggers. See id. See also On a Knife’s Edge: The Rhinoceros Horn Trade in Yemen (visited Mar.
18, 1999) <http://www.traffic.org/publications/ summaries/summary_yemen.html> (discussing the
continued difficulties of halting the rhino dagger trade in Yemen).
75. See generally Crawford, supra note 73, (discussing Taiwanese and Chinese trade in tiger and
the difficulty of CITES enforcement); Tiger Progress? The Response to CITES Resolution Conf. 9.13
(visited Mar. 18, 1999) <http://www.traffic.org/publications/summaries/summary_tiger.html>
(discussing the poor response to the tiger resolution adopted at the 1994 Conference of the Parties).
76. See Mel Sunquist Anup Shah, What I’ve Learned about Tigers, INT’L WILDLIFE, Nov. 21,
1997, at 12, 14.
77. See Michael ‘t Sas-Rolfes, Who Will Save the Wild Tiger? (visited Mar. 18, 1999)
<http://www.perc.org/ps12.htm>.
78. See Luke Phillips, Kuwait’s “Aristocat” Tigers Move to Luxury New Home, AGENCE
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like the elephant and rhino, is a victim of ubiquitous poaching.79 Tiger
products are highly demanded in the Far East for their medicinal and
aphrodisiac value.80 Tiger bone is believed to cure ulcers, rheumatism, fever,
and burns.81 Tiger penis is believed to work as an aphrodisiac.82 A wild tiger
killed in the Russian Far East fetches as much as $10,000 on the Russian
black market.83 Despite widespread publicity and action, the Appendix I ban
on the tiger trade has been unable to thwart the pernicious effects of the
illegal trade.84
4. The Parrot
Forty-two species of parrots are listed on Appendix I.85 During the 1980s,
the United States imported about 270,000 parrots a year, plus an additional
150,000 smuggled parrots, making the United States the largest importer of
wild-caught parrots.86 The U.S. parrot trade generates an estimated $300
million in annual profits.87 This lucrative trade in parrots has decimated the
populations of wild parrots.88 Parrots are sold on the black market in the
United States for as much as $20,000 a piece.89 Equally disturbing are the
estimates that for every parrot smuggled across the Mexican border, another
FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 19, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16602697.
79. In India, one man, Maharaja of Surguja, claimed to have killed 1,150 tigers. See Sunquist
Anup Shah, supra note 76, at 15. Poaching in India continues to be a problem today. In 1995 alone,
poachers killed an estimated 73 tigers, and shipped their parts and carcasses into China. See id. at 18.
80. See FITZGERALD, supra note 24, at 39.
81. See Sunquist Anup Shah, supra note 76, at 18. The use of tiger bone is well established in
several Asian Cultures. See ‘t Sas-Rolfes, supra note 77. In fact, traditional Chinese medicine’s use of
tiger bone dates back at least as far as 500 A.D. See id.
82. See FITZGERALD, supra note 24, at 39. Other tiger parts also have traditional uses. Tiger
blood is thought to build the constitution and strengthen willpower. See id. Tiger meat is viewed as a
delicacy to some Chinese. See ‘t Sas-Rolfes, supra note 77. Tiger skin is valued for display purposes.
See Crawford, supra note 73, at 561.
83. See Sunquist Anup Shah, supra note 76, at 18.
84. See ‘t Sas-Rolfes, supra note 77.
85. See DORENE BOLZE, THE WILD BIRD TRADE: WHEN A BIRD IN THE HAND MEANS NONE IN
THE BUSH 10 (1992). “It is testament to the failing of CITES that despite listing and attempted
regulation, so many parrot species are now threatened by the international trade.” Id. In fact, all 337
parrot species, except for two captive-bred species, are listed on the CITES’ appendices. See id.
86. See id. at 4. “Members of the parrot family (Psittacidae) are among the most popular pets in
the world, perhaps second only to dogs and cats.” FITZGERALD, supra note 24, at 157. In fact, “people
have been teaching parrots to ‘talk’ for over 2,000 years.” Id.
87. See id.
88. For example, one parrot species, the hyacinth macaw of South America, has plummeted from
an estimated 100,000 in 1950, to only 2,500 to 5,000 in the late 1980s, “primarily because of the bird
trade.” See id. at 6.
89. See Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 58, at 48. The illegal parrot trade in South America is
often more lucrative than the illegal drug trade. See id.
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ten die in the attempt to reach prospective buyers.90 Regrettably, the
Convention has failed to control the devastating wild bird trade, especially in
parrots.91 “Few exporting countries have the resources to issue permits based
on a determination of a species’ status in the wild, to enforce CITES
regulations, or to check the accuracy of the required documents and
permits.”92 As a result, the bird trade “is rife with illegal activity.”93 “In most
cases, wild birds are traded under the guise of legality with falsified
documentation.”94 One estimate suggests that as many as one-fourth to one-
third of all parrots imported into the United States are accomplished with
falsified documentation.95 “Even the US, which has some of the most
protective wildlife laws and sophisticated enforcement capabilities, has been
unable to effectively control the wild bird trade across and within its
borders.”96
Another tragedy of the parrot trade is that the rural people who trap the
birds “derive the least economic benefit from the trade, receiving only about
one to two percent of the retail price.”97 The rural trappers capture the birds
from communal lands, and do not own the rights to the land or to the birds.
Thus, the birds are “free for the taking and there is little incentive to manage
the harvest for long-term production.”98
90. See BOLZE, supra note 85, at 8. The primary method for capturing parrots in South America
entails “cutting down the nesting tree or hacking open the nest cavities in order to remove all the
chicks.” Id. at 7. This process kills at least 10% of the young. See id. See also RON THOMPSON, THE
WILDLIFE GAME 180 (1992) (describing the destruction of nesting sites). Parrots also are killed during
transport due to “overcrowding, poor ventilation, dehydration, poor nutrition, and extreme changes in
temperature.” BOLZE, supra note 85, at 8. Still more parrots die during quarantine, primarily from
infectious diseases. See id.
Much like the illegal parrot trade, the illegal trade in baby chimpanzees for use as pets results in
similar devastation to the species through capture and transit. According to primatologist Alison
Cronin who runs the Monkey World ape sanctuary in Dorset, England, “[i]n order to capture the
babies, the poachers slaughter their mothers and other dominant chimpanzees. . . . Usually they are
crammed into wooden crates and brought to Europe by ships. For every baby chimp that gets here, at
least 10 others die.” Amberin Zaman, Chimp Poachers Find Market in Turkey Despite International
Ban, Lucrative Primate Trade is Flourishing, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1998, at A2.
91. See BOLZE, supra note 85, at 10.
92. Id. at 11.
93. Id. at 12.
94. Id.
95. See id. “Typically the bird’s country of origin is purposefully misidentified, the type and
number of each species in the shipment are incorrectly listed, birds are falsely claimed to be captive-
bred, and the commercial nature of the shipment is obscured.” Id.
96. Id. at 13. “The US, for instance, has never sufficiently financed the agencies that enforce and
implement its laws affecting the bird trade. Only 65 inspectors are on duty in the US, and they are able
to inspect only one quarter of the annual 83,000 shipments.” Id.
97. Id. at 9. In Mexico, trappers only receive $19 for providing a parrot that is later sold for as
much as $3,000. See id.
98. Id.
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III. TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS, TRADE BANS, AND SUSTAINABLE USE
A. Tragedy of the Commons
The rapid over-exploitation of commercially valuable wildlife is not a
recent phenomenon. The plights of the buffalo and passenger pigeon are
prime examples. At the time of the Spanish explorers, a “brown sea” of 75
million buffalo roamed the western plains of North America.99 By 1895, only
800 buffalo remained, most in captivity or on private land.100 The passenger
pigeon suffered a similar fate. It went from being one of the most numerous
species of bird on earth, at approximately three billion, to extinction by
1914.101 Massive market hunting caused the bird’s extinction.102
Social scientists have tried to explain why certain species are decimated
and others are thriving. On its face, it seems quite paradoxical that the
American buffalo was driven to near extinction but not the “Hereford, the
Angus, or the Jersey cow.”103 The crucial distinction lies in the inherent
difference between public and private ownership rights.104
In 1968, Professor Garrett Hardin coined the phrase “tragedy of the
commons” to explain how a lack of clearly defined property rights leads to
the over-exploitation of a resource.105 If a resource is held for public use in
the commons, then individuals acting rationally will overconsume the public
resource. The essential problem is the inability to exclude others from the
consumption of the resource.106 The rational individual knows that what he
99. See Robert J. Smith, Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private Property
Right in Wildlife, CATO J., Fall 1981 at 439, 442.
100. See id. Smith reveals the similar tragedy of the sea turtle in the Carribean. See id. at 461.
Before the Europeans arrived in the Caribbean, the green turtle, Chelonia mydas, numbered close to 50
million. By 1620, over-exploitation reduced green turtle populations so much that the Bermuda
assembly prohibited their killing. See id. at 461-62. Presently green turtles number only a few
thousand in the Caribbean and approximately 400,000 worldwide. See id. at 462.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 443. Smith further points out that the heath hen went extinct, the prairie chicken nearly
went extinct, but other chickens such as the Rhode Island Red, the Leghorn, and the Barred Rock are
thriving despite not being native to North America. See id.
104. See Ike C. Sugg, To Save an Endangered Species, Own One, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1992, at
A10.
105. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1243 (Dec. 1968).
106. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 354
(1967). Demsetz outlines the essential distinction by asserting that communal ownership is:
[A] right which can be exercised by all members of the community. . . . Communal ownership
means that the community denies to the state or to individual citizens the right to interfere with
any person’s exercise of communally-owned rights. Private ownership implies that the community
recognizes the right of the owner to exclude others from exercising the owner’s private rights.
Id.
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or she does not consume today may very well be consumed by someone else
tomorrow.107 The end result is that public ownership often results in
“overuse, waste, and extinction; but private ownership results in sustained-
yield use and preservation.”108
Ocean fisheries provide a classic example of the tragedy of the commons.
According to free market environmentalists Terry L. Anderson and Donald
R. Leal:
The rule of capture dominates: any fish left by one fisherman is
available to another. Rather than leaving fish to grow and reproduce,
the incentive is to harvest the stock before others do. With each
fisherman facing this incentive, the end result is for the fish stock to be
over-exploited.109
Private property rights, on the other hand, create incentives for private
owners to preserve their resources. The rule of capture no longer applies
because the private owner is able to exclude others from consuming his or
her resources via enforceable private property rights. Consequently, the
rational owner considers the long-term capital value of the resource.110 The
decision to consume the resource today is weighed against the costs of not
having it tomorrow or ten years from now. The private owner thus, in self-
interest, will opt to manage the resource on a sustainable basis.111 This
difference is precisely why the buffalo nearly went extinct, but the Jersey
cow prospered.112
It is important to note that the over-exploitation of public resources and
the sustainable use of private resources both result from rational behavior by
107. Smith posits a simple question that exemplifies the analysis: “Which would be picked at the
optimum ripeness, blackberries along the roadside or blackberries in a farmer’s garden?” Smith, supra
note 99, at 444.
108. Id.
109. TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 122 (1991).
Anderson & Leal further state the following:
[O]pen access to the resource results in lower than optimal (if not total depletion of) stock and an
over-investment in fishing effort. . . . Being the first to exploit the fishery allows the highest
returns, because the costs of finding and catching fish will be the lowest. This race to the best
fishing grounds is often manifest in the form of over-capitalization in radar, sonar, faster boats,
and larger nets. The result is lower profits for the too many fishermen investing in too much
capital to catch too few fish.
Id. at 123. See generally Ralph Townsend & James A. Wilson, An Economic View of the Tragedy of
the Commons, in THE QUESTION OF THE COMMONS 311 (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds.,
1987) (discussing the over-exploitation of fisheries).
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the consumer.113 It is not a debate between a consumer’s rational and
irrational behavior.114 “In both cases we are witnessing rational behavior, for
resource users are acting in the only manner available to them to obtain any
economic or psychological value from the resource.”115 Consequently, it is a
mistake to believe that the overuse of public resources can be changed
through education or persuasion.116
B. Trade Bans
Tragedy of the commons analysis clearly suggests that the solution to the
over-exploitation of the commons is the creation of private property rights in
the commons.117 This, however, is not the traditional approach to solving
commons problems. The traditional approach, as exemplified by CITES, is
the regulation of public resources through access and trade restrictions.
CITES Appendix I ban on commercial trade attempts to reduce the supply
and demand for endangered species. In theory, a ban on the international
trade of a resource could reduce the supply of the resource by deterring
suppliers from incurring the additional risks and costs associated with
supplying an illegal good.118 The practical effect of a trade ban, however, is
the creation of black market trade. As the costs of supplying the good
increase, so too does the price of the good, which induces persons best suited
at evading the law to engage in the black market supply of the good.119
Consequently, as long as people demand a good and are willing to pay a high
price for it, the black market will find a way to meet demand.120
In theory, an effective trade ban also must influence the demand for a
good. People must decide that they no longer want the banned good either
because they do not want to incur the addition costs associated with obtaining
an illegal good, or because they are morally persuaded that the good should
not be traded.121 One difficulty with eliminating demand for a good,
113. See id. at 456.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. See id. As Smith points out, the attempt to create a new environmental ethic will have little
effect upon the person who relies on using a resource for his or her survival and must do so before
someone else does. See id.
117. See generally SCOTT LEHMANN, PRIVATIZING PUBLIC LANDS (1995) (advocating
privatization as a means of improving land management).
118. See Heimert, supra note 57, at 1492. The risks of supplying an illegal good include the risks
of detection, prosecution, and punishment. See id. The increased costs of supplying an illegal good
include costs incurred in evading the law and costs incurred from confiscation of the good. See id.
119. See Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 58, at 48.
120. See id.
121. See Heimert, supra note 57, at 1491.
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especially a wildlife resource, is that people desire to own rare and exotic
goods regardless of their illegality.122
In practice, the ban on the international trade of ivory and rhino horn has
failed to eliminate the demand for them. The ban, however, accomplishes
three things: “prices increase, people with a comparative advantage at
avoiding detection— usually criminals and corrupt public officials— take
over the formerly legal market, and, in the case of a resource owned in
common, the resource disappears.”123 Thus, it becomes apparent that the
incentive to engage in black market trade coupled with the many
enforcement difficulties greatly reduces the effectiveness of a trade ban to
preserve endangered wildlife.
C. Sustainable Use
In response to the deficiencies inherent in the preservationist no-trade
ideology, a new breed of environmentalism has emerged that advocates
private property rights and legalized trade in endangered wildlife. The new
conservationist approach emphasizes the need to create a system of property
rights in wildlife that overcomes the tragedy of the commons and leads to the
sustainable use of natural resources.124 Sustainable use is the cornerstone of
conservationism and implies using natural resources “at a rate within their
capacity for renewal.”125 Conservationists attempt to create the necessary
economic incentives for people to act as “careful stewards rather than
careless exterminators.”126 Conservationists realize that the best way to
preserve wildlife is to create a system where wildlife can pay its own way.
1. CITES and the Debate Over Sustainable Use
As discussed above, the Convention’s preamble and provisions include
notions of both preservationism and conservationism.127 The Appendix I ban
122. See id.
123. Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 58, at 48.
124. See supra note 9 for a discussion of the difference between conservationism and
preservationism.
125. John G. Robinson, The Limits to Caring: Sustainable Living and the Loss of Biodiversity,
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY, Mar. 1993, at 20, 23.
126. See Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 58, at 48. Simmons and Kreuter reveal the fundamental
distinction between preservationism and conservationism in the context of the ivory trade: “proponents
of a global ban on ivory trade are asking the wrong question. They ask, ‘How do we stop the ivory
trade in order to remove the incentive for poaching?’ They should ask, ‘How do we make the
elephants valuable enough that people have an incentive to be careful stewards rather than careless
exterminators?’” Id.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
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on commercial trade is clearly a preservationist regulation. On the other
hand, Appendix II represents a conservationist regulation because it permits
commercial trade that is performed on a sustainable basis.128 Thus, the
decision to list a species on Appendix I or II often results in a clash between
the two ideologies. While there are general guidelines for the listing of a
species on Appendices I and II (the Fort Lauderdale Criteria),129 the signatory
parties ultimately make the listing decision by a two-thirds majority vote at
the biennial Conference of the Parties.130 Moreover, the parties are not bound
to accept even compelling evidence meeting the Fort Lauderdale Criteria for
listing.131 Therefore, the voting process often turns on the parties’ preferred
environmental ideology.
The best example of the CITES debate between the preservationist and
conservationist ideologies is the story of the African elephant. The African
elephant was placed on Appendix II in 1977.132 By 1989, populations of
African elephants in eastern African nations had plummeted,133 and the
United States and several European nations pushed for the international ban
on ivory trade.134 With the support of the United States, Europe, and the
eastern African nations, CITES voted to move the African elephant from
Appendix II to Appendix I.135 The southern African nations of Zimbabwe,
128. See CITES, supra note 4, 27 U.S.T. at 1093. Trade in Appendix II species is sustainable if it
“will not be detrimental to the survival of that species.” Id.
129. See text accompanying notes 32-37.
130. See CITES, supra note 4, 27 U.S.T. at 1110.
131. See Stephen L. Kass, The Economic Impact of Wildlife Protection Measures Was a
Prevailing Theme at the Most Recent Biennial Conference on Endangered Species Worldwide, NAT’L
L.J., Aug. 11, 1997, at B4.
132. See FITZGERALD, supra note 24, at 62. The Asian elephant has been listed on Appendix I
since 1975. See ADAMS & MCSHANE, supra note 58, at 63.
133. From 1979 to 1989, Central Africa’s elephant population dropped from 497,400 to 274,800
and East Africa’s from 546,650 to 154,720. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the decrease in elephant populations from 1979 to 1989.
134. See Heimert, supra note 57, at 1478-79. One of the key impetuses for the decision to move
the African elephant to Appendix I was a study by the Ivory Trade Review Group released five months
before the 1989 Convention of the Parties meeting in Lausanne, Switzerland. See ADAMS &
MCSHANE, supra note 58, at 63. An independent panel of experts conducted The Ivory Trade Review
Group study and reported on the dwindling elephant population trends and the effects of the ivory
trade. See id. at 62. Although the report did not endorse banning the international trade in ivory by
moving the elephant to Appendix I, many of the CITES nations relied on the report to reach their
decisions to ratify the move to Appendix I. See id. at 63. Prior to the release of the report, many
conservation groups endorsed the “split-listing” of the African elephant— a solution where the
elephant would be listed on Appendix I in the countries where elephant populations were most
threatened, and would remain on Appendix II in countries that were successfully managing their
elephant populations. See id. In practice, this meant that elephant populations of east, west, and central
Africa would be moved to Appendix I, and the southern African elephants would remain on Appendix
II due to their successful management schemes. See id. at 63-64.
135. See id.
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Zambia, Botswana, Malawi, and South Africa opposed the ivory ban because
their elephant populations were increasing or remaining stable.136 These
countries were making money from the sale of ivory and elephant hides and
using the proceeds to aid local people and conservation programs.137 Despite
the efforts of the southern African nations to convince CITES of the merits of
their programs, CITES parties voted to move the elephant to Appendix I.138
The southern African nations took reservations139 to the up-listing, but no
other significant ivory-purchasing nations followed suit.140 Consequently, the
southern African nations had little opportunity to engage in legal ivory
trade.141
The ivory debate resurfaced at the 1992 Conference of the Parties in Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. The group of countries favoring managed ivory trade,
led by Zimbabwe, proposed allowing countries with effective sustainable use
programs to trade ivory internationally.142 The Conference of the Parties,
however, rejected the proposal.143
At the 1997 Convention of the Parties in Harare, Zimbabwe, the southern
African nations of Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Namibia proposed that the
African elephant be down-listed to Appendix II due to their increasing
populations.144 These countries argued that elephant herds were becoming so
large that “they were overrunning communities, destroying crops and
injuring people.”145 In addition, the three countries argued that they should be
136. See BONNER, supra note 43, at 91-92; ADAMS & MCSHANE, supra note 58, at 64, 66.
Zimbabwe’s elephant population grew from 30,000 in 1979 to 50,000 in 1993. See BONNER, supra
note 43, at 92. From 1983 to 1993, Botswana successfully doubled its elephant population to about
56,000. See id. at 91. See also Simmons & Kreuter, supra note 58, at 46 (from 1979 to 1989,
Botswana’s elephant population grew from 20,000 to 51,000). In South Africa, the elephant population
remained stable. See BONNER, supra note 43, at 92.
137. See BONNER, supra note 43, at 92.
138. “The refusal to recognize regional differences in Africa resulted in part from the popular
perception of Africa as a single entity, where a simple solution would work. Some people in the
conservation community understood well the subtleties of the ivory trade, but the general public’s
overwhelming, emotional response to the perceived crisis— a response fueled by lurid advertising
campaigns— made anything less than total support for the ivory ban a practical impossibility for any
conservation organization dependent on member contributions. . . . The majority of the people
lobbying African governments had no understanding of the day-to-day realities of African
conservation or African life. Yet groups like Friends of Animals and Greenpeace can, with the power
of the purse, exert tremendous influence.” ADAMS & MCSHANE, supra note 58, at 64-65.
139. See supra text accompanying note 40. These nations included Zimbabwe, Botswana, Zambia,
Malawi, Mozambique, and South Africa. See THOMPSON, supra note 90, at 31.




144. See Kass, supra note 131, at B4.
145. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss4/8
p1323+note+Marsh.doc 03/22/00   9:31 AM
1999] IMPROVING THE EFFICACY OF CITES 1311
allowed to dispose of registered stocks of raw ivory and to apply the
proceeds toward conservation expenditures.146 The Conference voted to
transfer the elephant populations of Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Namibia to
Appendix II while leaving all other elephant populations on Appendix I, and
to allow a one-time experimental sale of 59 tons of stockpiled ivory to Japan,
provided that the countries first meet several strict conditions.147 In addition,
the parties voted to allow Zimbabwe to export elephant hides and leather
goods for commercial purposes, and agreed to allow Zimbabwe to export
ivory carvings for non-commercial purposes.148 In the end, the
conservationist ideals of the southern African nations won out despite United
States’ opposition,149 and the Convention moved a step toward recognizing
the value of sustainable use conservation.
2. Sustainable Use in Practice
a. The African Elephant
Zimbabwe provides the prototypical sustainable use management scheme
for protecting the African elephant. In 1982, Zimbabwe created the
Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources
(“CAMPFIRE”).150 The CAMPFIRE program was founded on “the premise
that the wildlife belongs to the person on whose land it is found.”151 A key
insight to CAMPFIRE is the realization that the “people living with wildlife
pay the price for conservation— threat of injury by dangerous animals,
damage to crops, and so forth— and so must reap the benefits; and . . . that
these people have the collective capacity to manage their natural
resources.”152 In 1989, the radical program granted the people of
146. See id.
147. See Ivory Trade Decisions at the 41st Meeting of the CITES Standing Committee (visited
Feb. 20, 1999) <http://www.traffic.org/news/ivorytradedecisions.html>. The experimental sale of
ivory to Japan was subsequently approved at the 41st meeting of the CITES Standing Committee held
February 1999 in Geneva, Switzerland. See id.
148. See Summary Report on the 1997 CITES Conference (visited Mar. 18, 1999)
<http://www.worldwildlife.org/new/traffic/aug97/cites.htm>.
149. See Kass, supra note 131, at B4.
150. See BONNER, supra note 43, at 253.
151. Id. at 285. Returning wildlife management to localized custodianships was a great departure
from accepted notions of conservation. See ADAMS & MCSHANE, supra note 58, at 178. The move,
however, sought to fuse “ecological responsibility and the communal interest characteristic of
traditional African cultures.” Id. The program “envisions a system of natural resource cooperatives
with essentially the same rights and obligations as private owners of commercial ranches, all
inhabitants of the community being shareholders.” Id.
152. ADAMS & MCSHANE, supra note 58, at 178.
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Nyaminyami the authority to manage the wildlife in their communal district
of northwestern Zimbabwe.153
Each year, the national wildlife department grants the local council of
Nyaminyami the right to hunt or cull one percent of the elephants within the
district.154 In 1989, the Nyaminyami district earned enough from the sale of
wildlife products (including elephants) to fund its conservation program and
to provide much needed money for social services.155 Each elephant hunted
or culled provided $5,000 of profit for the community.156 The same people in
the community who were once elephant poachers are now elephant
protectors because they now have a vested interest in the benefits of
sustainable use management.157 Consequently, poaching has ceased, and “the
people themselves are the ones who now apprehend any strangers who try to
kill ‘their’ wild animals.”158
The success of CAMPFIRE, however, was undermined by the African
elephant’s move to Appendix I in 1989. The ivory ban reduced the
Nyaminyami district’s revenue by as much as $125,000 per year.159 This
amount lost due to the ivory ban is roughly equal to the amount of foreign aid
the district receives annually for schools and nutrition programs.160
Hopefully, the Conference of the Parties’ 1997 decision to split-list the
African elephant161 will revitalize the CAMPFIRE program and allow the
rural people of Zimbabwe to once again benefit from wildlife conservation.
b. The Rhino
South Africa has almost single-handedly rescued the white rhino from
extinction. In 1900, there were fewer than twenty remaining in the world, and
today South Africa has over 7,000.162
The success is due to the active management of Kruger National Park.
The park uses the proceeds from tourism and the sale of hunting rights to
153. See BONNER, supra note 43, at 253.
154. See Heimert, supra note 57, at 1483.
155. See id. at 1483. In its first year of operation, Nyaminyami earned a profit of $30,000, and
with the aid the Zimbabwe Trust, a local foundation, $50 was distributed to each of the district’s 2,000
households— an amount nearly equaling one-fourth of the average annual income. See ADAMS &
MCSHANE, supra note 58, at 179.
156. See THOMPSON, supra note 90, at 33. On average, each hunter who travels to Zimbabwe to
shoot an elephant spends $26,000. See id. at 33-34.
157. See id. at 34.
158. Id.
159. See BONNER, supra note 43, at 271.
160. See id.
161. See supra text accompanying note 144.
162. See Tusks and Horns and Conservationists, ECONOMIST, May 31, 1997, at 44, 44-45.
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fund its highly effective antipoaching patrols. In fact, the populations of
white rhinos are so strong that the government permits limited hunting of
them; the cost is $25,000 a rhino.163
In Zimbabwe, the last of the country’s black rhinos are found at Africa’s
largest private wildlife refuge, the 1,235 square mile Save Valley Wildlife
Conservancy.164 The Zimbabwean government transported the remaining
wild rhinos to the conservancy in a last ditch effort to save them from
poaching.165 The fifty-one rhinos inhabiting the conservancy receive around
the clock protection from poaching.166 Revenue from tourism provides the
necessary funding for the rhino’s protection. In addition, tourism revenue is
funneled back into the rural district where it has paid for domestic water
wells, a grinding mill, and a school for 600 children.167 Still, possibilities for
greater revenue exist. Part of the Conservancy’s rhino protection involves
regular dehorning of the rhinos in order to remove the incentive to poach
them.168 The dehorning process is costly, roughly $1,400 per rhino, and must
be repeated at least every two years.169 The Conservancy could benefit
greatly from the legal sale of rhino horn collected through the dehorning
process.170 The Appendix I ban, however, proscribes the legal trade of rhino
horn and thus, deprives the Conservancy of a significant source of potential
revenue for its sustainable use program.
c. The Parrot
Suriname is the only place in South America where parrots are harvested
163. See id.
164. See Rosenthal, supra note 62.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id. The conservancy works with the local people by giving them an incentive to stop
poaching. If a poacher offers a local person money for information on the rhino, the conservancy will
pay the local person 10 times more for turning in the poacher. See id.
A similar sustainable use success story is that of the Australian crocodile. The Edward River
Crocodile Farm on the western edge of Australia’s Cape York Peninsula is run by the Pormpuraaw
aboriginal people. See Crocodile Skin Sales Boost Small Australian Tribe’s Economy, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 1993, at 3. The project was started by the Pormpuraaw people in 1973 to conserve the
endangered crocodile, and within three years, they began to harvest the animals commercially. See id.
The Pormpuraaw people previously had 100% unemployment; now they are employed and can afford
better education and health care. See id. In 1992, the farm exported $340,000 worth of skins, which
comprised a third of the total exports for the entire Australian crocodile skin industry. See id. The farm
also launched a tourist component to the farm. The Pormpuraaw give tours of the farm and operate a
small shop selling crocodile handbags, belts, and key rings. In 1993, a crocodile handbag sold for as
much as $10,200 in Paris, Tokyo, and New York. See id.
168. See Rosenthal, supra note 62.
169. See id.
170. See id.
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on a sustainable use basis for the benefit of the local people.171 Suriname
wildlife authorities issue a specified number of parrot-catcher permits to
selected rural peasants, and each peasant is assigned an area of the forest and
a quota for a particular species.172 The authorities also issue a select number
of parrot-dealer permits and establish a minimum price that dealers must pay
the parrot-catchers for the birds they catch.173 In addition, export permits are
not granted until parrot dealers in the United States deposit a specified sum in
a Suriname bank, a sum representing the fair market value of the wholesale
trade.174 As a result, the parrot-catchers obtain fair value for the parrots, and
“jealously guard their forest allocations” from poachers and “slash-and-burn
farmers whose wasteful agricultural practices would destroy the vital
habitats.”175 The program in Suriname has ended the overexploitation that
previously plagued its parrot populations.176 Now the people and the parrots
are benefiting from the sustainable-yield parrot trade.
IV. PROPOSAL
The efficacy of CITES can be vastly improved by adopting sustainable
use alternatives to anti-use preservationism. First, CITES must
fundamentally alter its pervading preservationist ideology by recognizing the
tremendous improvements in species conservation available from sustainable
use programs. Second, CITES must recognize the benefits of legal trade in
such products as ivory and rhino horn that are harvested from sustainable use
programs. CITES then must work to establish sustainable use programs
across many more nations so that legal trade in ivory and rhino horn can
prosper. Third, CITES must consider further sustainable use programs such
as game ranching, tourism, and captive breeding as legitimate ways to
preserve wildlife and habitat.
A. Necessity for an Ideological Change
The move toward increasing CITES’ reliance on sustainable use
programs must start with a fundamental change in the Convention’s
171. See THOMPSON, supra note 90, at 46.
172. See id. at 179.
173. See id. The dealers’ permits specify which species they can sell, and the dealers’ holdings are
subject to inspection by the Suriname authorities. See id.
174. See id. at 180.
175. Id. In addition, the behavior of parrot-catchers and dealers with permits is, in part, regulated
by their peers, who covet the limited number of permits available. See id.
176. See id.
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ideological preference. The parties must recognize that banning the
international trade in endangered species is not the long-term solution to the
problem. The trade ban is at best, an inefficient and costly attempt to protect
the world’s most coveted species. Enforcement problems abound and show
few signs of improving in the near future.177 In many instances, the
inflexibility of the trade ban is perversely affecting species protection in
nations with conservationist management schemes.178 While the Appendix I
ban on commercial trade is clearly better than the absence of regulation, it
must yield to the superior conservationist approach that constructively uses
trade to protect valuable wildlife through the active management of species
and habitat.179
The ban on trade in Appendix I species rests on the dubious assumption
that halting the trade in endangered species will save those species. The
entire effectiveness of a trade ban relies on the government’s ability to police
its prohibition on trade. The government must expend significant resources to
combat its citizens’ natural tendency to consume wildlife as a source of
income and subsistence. In practice, this proves a daunting task for even the
wealthiest of nations.180 Lesser-developed countries, which pose the gravest
threat to species extinction, simply cannot generate the funds to enforce the
trade ban.181 Thus, a trade ban becomes a no-win situation where species
hover at the brink of extinction while people are forced to absorb the heavy
costs of policing the ineffective ban.
The conservationist approach, on the other hand, recognizes that the focus
on halting the trade is misplaced. Conservationism correctly focuses on
creating positive incentives for individuals to protect species and wildlife
habitat. If wildlife is to compete with alternative land uses, it is essential for
wildlife conservation to pay its own way. Thus, the solution is not to ban the
exploitation of wildlife, but to implement schemes where the benefits derived
from the consumption of wildlife provide the necessary incentives to protect
177. See supra text accompanying notes 48-57.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 159-60,170-71.
179. Authors Adams and McShane point out the great value of management in Africa as follows:
[W]ildlife is in fact one of the most productive uses of land in Africa, particularly in semi-arid
areas. People living near protected areas thus would be wise to preserve their wildlife, rather than
killing it off so the land could be used for something else. Mass wildlife tourism, as in Kenya,
produces $100 per hectare, while more exclusive tourism brings in $50 per hectare. Sport hunting
generates $10 per hectare, double that of commercial hunting for meats and hides. Cattle ranching
for beef on Zimbabwe’s semi-arid pasture is actually a drain on the economy, costing $5 per
hectare.
ADAMS & MCSHANE, supra note 58, at 172.
180. See supra text accompanying note 50.
181. See supra text accompanying note 50.
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wildlife.182 The conservationist approach boldly asserts that regulated trade in
wildlife is the necessary and best means to achieve the end of wildlife
conservation.183
A fundamental shift from the pervading preservationist ideology to a
conservationist ideology certainly will not happen overnight. For any such
shift to occur, leading industrialized nations must forge the way. Specifically,
the United States must open its eyes to the realities of wildlife conservation
in lesser-developed nations.184 The reality is that people are going to exploit
wildlife with or without a trade ban. The question remains whether CITES
will move forward to implement a plan geared toward the sustainable
utilization of wildlife.
B. Lifting the Trade Ban and Implementing Sustainable Use Trade in
Wildlife and Wildlife Products
The first step toward implementing sustainable use conservationism is
lifting the Appendix I trade ban on certain wildlife products with established
182. Such a scheme can be described as symbiosis, where “man’s ‘use’ of his wildlife resources
benefits both himself and the wild animal populations that he ‘uses’”. THOMPSON, supra note 90, at
44. This concept of mutual benefit is the underlying principle of conservationism.
183. The problem is essentially an economic one: “how much does it cost to save a [species] and
who will pay?” ADAMS & MCSHANE, supra note 58, at 168. If both the public and private sectors
cannot generate revenue from conserving a species, then little incentive remains to engage in
conservation. However, “[i]f the benefits of saving a species are tangible and measurable, . . . why not
turn over the task to a private party who is willing to bear the cost in exchange for a share of the
benefit?” Charles C. Mann & Mark L. Plummer, The Butterfly Problem, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan.
1992, at 47, 65. One author has even gone so far as to suggest that preservationist “antipathy to
markets reinforces one’s suspicion that certain preservationists are more anti-capitalist than they are
pro-environment.” Sugg, supra note 104, at A10.
Much is made about the ‘morality’ of commercializing wildlife in the minds of preservationists.
See THOMPSON, supra note 90, at 47. In their opinion, wildlife should be left in its pristine state and
certainly not exploited by the private sector. In reality, the ethical overtones of preservationism carry
little weight. As zoologist Colin Tudge writes, “It is difficult in this world to do anything that is
unequivocally good, and if we have to choose between exploitation and obliteration, then the former
emerges as the lesser of two evils. . . .  [I]t is ethically no worse to kill and eat an antelope than to kill
and eat a domestic sheep. At least, the sheep would not appreciate the difference.” TUDGE, supra note
1, at 8.
184. One should note the apparent double standard in the western preservationist approach. Dr.
David Cumming, who runs the World Wildlife Foundation’s Multispecies Project in Zimbabwe,
summarizes the hypocrisy as follows:
Go to North America and ask people about reintroducing wolves to Yellowstone National
Park. . . . What sort of reaction do you get? And yet the same people have the nerve to say to
Africans, ‘You keep your elephant and your rhino, in the number that we think you should.’ In
other words, Africa should have a million elephants or more, rather than 250,000. . . . 250,000 is a
long way from extinction, when you compare it with the grizzly bear. How many grizzlies are
there in the lower forty-eight states? A couple hundred?
ADAMS & MCSHANE, supra note 58, at 174.
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sustainable use programs. This would entail opening the door to trade in such
products as ivory and rhino horn harvested from nations with existing
sustainable use programs.185 These nations would use the proceeds from the
sale of stockpiled reserves and culling efforts to improve the protection of
existing elephants and rhinos. In addition, local people authorized with the
management of native lands would use the much-needed proceeds from the
sale of ivory and rhino horn harvested from their lands to improve the quality
of their social infrastructures.
The success of the regulated trade in ivory and rhino horn necessitates
wide-scale participation in sustainable use programs throughout Africa and
beyond. The difficulty of distinguishing ivory and rhino horn harvested from
legitimate sources versus that harvested from poaching poses the threat that
illegally obtained products will enter the trade.186 Therefore, it is essential
that CITES parties work together to establish sustainable use programs
across multiple nations so that no nation is benefiting at the expense of other
nations. These changes will necessitate cooperation among CITES parties
and will require time to implement. The Conference of the Parties’ 1997
decision to split-list the African elephant is certainly a step in the right
direction and will prove a great impetus for other African nations to take
control of their wildlife management and to share in the fruits of sustainable
use conservation.
C. Game Ranching, Tourism, and Captive Breeding
Opening the doors to wildlife trade is just the beginning to a successful
conservationist scheme. Game ranching, captive breeding, and tourism
provide further opportunities for species, people, and the government to
benefit mutually from wildlife conservation.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 150-69. Nations practicing sustainable development of
elephants and rhinos include the southern African nations of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana, Malawi,
and South Africa.
186. See Hugh Dellios, Elephant Ivory Sale Okayed: Poaching Fears Raised as Ban Eased, CHI.
TRIB., Jun. 20, 1997, at 1. At the 1997 Conference of the Parties held in Harare, Zimbabwe, CITES
voted to allow the southern African nations of Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe to sell 59 tons of
stockpiled elephant tusks to Japan as an experimental ease of the ivory ban. See id. Those opposed to
the sale argue that the resumption of the ivory trade will stimulate poaching in countries that have not
been as successful at protecting elephants. See id. The southern African nations, however, characterize
the move as a “triumph for sanity, objectivity and for recognizing developing countries’ ability to take
their own decisions on natural resource management.” Id.
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1. Game Ranching
Game ranching is perhaps the most promising approach to wildlife
conservation.187 Game ranching involves the breeding and hunting of species
for profit.188 Revenue is generated in two ways: selling breeding rights and
selling hunting rights.189 Both components generate significant revenue. For
example, in 1990, the South African government sold a young breeding unit
of two male and three female black rhinos to a private game rancher for
$750,000.190 The hunting component also provides a great source of income.
In 1988, a ‘Big Five’ hunting safari in Africa fetched $110,000, which
consisted of the hunt of one elephant, one (aging) black rhino, one Cape
Buffalo, one lion, and one leopard.191 At these prices, it is easy to see the
opportunity for profit and the resulting interest in protecting rhinos.192 A
prerequisite to game ranching, however, is markets for its products, which
187. See Sugg, supra note 104, at A10.
188. The profit component, however, is not essential to game ranching. Some ranch owners breed
endangered animals solely for the sake of preserving them. For example, the Exotic Wildlife
Association, an international game ranching organization headquartered in Texas, has over 450
members who own over 200,000 animals comprising some 125 species. See id. Over 19,000 of those
animals are members of threatened or endangered species. See id. In fact, one member of the
Association, David Bamberger, has single-handedly preserved 29 of 31 remaining bloodlines of the
scimitar-horned oryx, which is near extinction in its native African range. See id. The oryx is more
numerous in Texas then in its native ranges. See id.
189. See THOMPSON, supra note 90, at 44.
190. See id. While the $750,000 figure might have been a bit inflated, the consensus is that a
young black rhino in 1991 was worth between $75,000 and $100,000 on the commercial market. See
id.
191. See id. Another estimate asserts that a three week safari in Zimbabwe or Tanzania hunting a
lion, an elephant, a leopard, and various antelopes costs about $50,000. See Why We Ought to Hunt
Big Animals: Killing to Be Kind, ECONOMIST, Apr. 20, 1996, at 76. The ‘ethical’ objections to such
hunting are quite apparent. See supra note 183 for a discussion of the ethical dilemma. One
conceivable alternative to the outright killing of big-game animals is the novel idea of “green hunting,”
which involves the use of tranquilizer guns to take down a large mammal. See Dianne Zuckerman,
Saving the Elephants: Introduction of ‘Green Hunting’ May Assure Mammals’ Survival, DENVER
POST, Oct. 20, 1998, at E1. After the animal is tranquilized, researches could apply radio tracking
devices to the animal and make necessary identification notes to aid in the research of the species. See
id.
Dr. John Beddington at Imperial College in London advances another novel idea that avoids
hurting elephants altogether. He suggests creating a market in ivory futures. See TUDGE, supra note 1,
at 9-10. Dr. Beddington points out that an elephant’s tusk grows exponentially throughout its life— the
bigger an elephant gets, the faster the tusks grow. See id. at 10. An investor could buy the rights to
receive an elephant’s tusks upon the elephant’s natural death. The investor would watch his investment
grow exponentially and would have a stake in protecting the elephant’s life and its tusks. See id.
192. “[T]he pursuit of profit motivates the rancher to maximize that which is valuable, which
means increasing wildlife numbers. It means preserving the genetic purity of the species, from which
its value is often derived. And it means taking care of the land— a collateral ecological benefit.” Sugg,
supra note 104, at A10.
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including meats, breeding stock, and hunting rights.193 “Few ranchers, no
matter how conservationist-minded, would go to the expense and effort of
raising wildlife if they could not earn a return from doing so.”194 Thus, the
livelihood of game ranchers depends on the ability of CITES to open the
avenues of international trade to game ranchers’ products.195
A significant advantage of game ranching is that it raises abundant
revenue while at the same time causing little disturbance to native habitat.196
Hunters cause fewer disturbances to the environment than tourists do
principally because one hunter brings in as much revenue as 100 tourists.197
A second advantage of game ranching is the incentive to transform
agricultural land back into native wildlife habitat to capture the higher yields
from game ranching.198 Finally, such preservation of native wildlife has the
added piggyback benefit of preserving non-hunted species as well.199
Game ranching can occur on private land, communal land, or public land.
Game ranching works best on private land where individuals open up their
land for hunting and breeding. Creating property rights in the species
effectively overcomes the tragedy of the commons, and ensures the
sustainable conservation of species and habitat. Game ranching also works
well on communal land, as exemplified by Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE
program.200 Giving local districts quasi-property rights to wildlife found on
their lands approximates the results achieved under private ownership, and
has the added benefit of enriching the lives of entire rural communities.201
Clearly, programs like CAMPFIRE work effectively to conserve species and
to enrich rural peoples’ lives.
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. National and international regulation of endangered species reduces the incentive of game
ranchers to buy, sell, or raise listed animals because ranchers are prohibited from obtaining and
profiting from the preservation of the species. See Sugg, supra note 104, at A10. For example,
ranchers stopped buying and raising the barasinga, a deer indigenous to India, after it was put on an
endangered list. See id.
196. See Why We Ought to Hunt Big Animals: Killing to Be Kind, supra note 191; Stephen M.
Weaver, The Elephant’s Best Friend, NAT’L REV., Aug. 12, 1991, at 42. Another estimate suggests
that a visiting hunter spends 14 times more money than a tourist— the hunter spends $725 to $1,500
per day and stays an average of 11 days, while the tourist spends $52 per day and stays an average of
three days. See id.
197. See Weaver, supra note 196, at 42.
198. See id.
199. See id. Game ranches normally encompass very large tracts of land. Some environmentalists
charge that game ranching is an “immoral” interference with the once free-roaming animal herds. See
Smith, supra note 99, at 454. “But free-roaming is a relative concept. These animals are certainly free-
roaming within the boundaries of the game ranches, and many of these ranches are enormous.” Id.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 151-62.
201. See id.
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Game ranching on public land is a third option and presents a government
with at least two choices. First, a government can convert public land into
private land by auctioning it off to a bidder who finds the land suitable for
game ranching. The conversion obviates the tragedy of the commons
problem associated with public land, but most governments are loath to
convert public land to private land. A second alternative is for the
government to issue tradable hunting permits entitling the recipient to hunt a
specified number of a species on public land.202 This method is essentially
the approach used successfully to harvest parrots in Suriname.203 Although
the permits in Suriname are not tradable, the inclusion of tradability is
beneficial because it ensures that the permits end up in the hands of those
who value them the most.204 The downside to the permit system is that where
land is expansive, it will prove difficult and costly to police the system.
Ideally, money from the sale of permits would fund the enforcement
expenses. One response is to limit permit hunting to national parks. Public
hunting in national parks, however, is widely scorned and is only permitted
in eight nations worldwide.205 The rationale for such a policy is puzzling
considering many countries permit livestock grazing, forest exploitation, and
fishing in national parks— all of which are more deleterious to habitats than
hunting.206 South Africa’s Kruger National Park is one example of a
successful hunting permit operation that uses permit proceeds to fund its
conservation efforts.207
2. Tourism
Tourism is an important supplement to a sustainable use program. For
example, in Rwanda, tourist interest in the gorilla accounts for $4 million of
the country’s yearly GDP, making it the country’s second largest industry.208
202. See Melissa Lauderdale, Reforming CITES: Using Market-Based Proposals to Save
Endangered Species, LBJ J. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, 1996 (visited Mar. 18, 1999)
<http://uts.cc.utexas.edu/~journal/1996/lauderda.htm>.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 171-76.
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The money brought into the country from tourism has changed local people’s
negative attitude toward wildlife, and gorilla poaching has suddenly
stopped.209 For tourism to succeed as a non-consumptive form of
conservation, governments must find ways to distribute the gains from
tourism to the local people through employment, compensation fees, and
social service programs.210 Giving local people an economic stake in tourism
increases their incentive to protect wildlife.211 This is the challenge for
tourism in the future, and CITES should promote tourist operations that are
managed by local people.
Non-consumptive, game-viewing tourism is a widely accepted means of
raising revenue to fund conservation.212 Tourism, however, cannot be viewed
in isolation, and must be supplemented by consumptive-use programs such
as game ranching. The main drawback to tourism is that a successful tourist
industry necessitates large capital expenditures and the maintenance of costly
infrastructures that many lesser-developed nations cannot support.213 The
creation of sustainable use game ranching, however, can stimulate and
complement tourism. For example, a successful community game ranching
program like CAMPFIRE could incorporate game-viewing tourism into its
operation. In many instances, tourism could be a valuable byproduct of game
ranching.
3. Captive Breeding
CITES should recognize the role that captive breeding can play in a
conservationist program. In the context of the wild bird trade, captive
breeding could “supply the market demand for the birds and reduce or
eliminate the demand on wild populations.”214 Captive breeding operations,
however, exist primarily in the United States and Europe, and few are in
place in nations that export wild birds.215 This disparity demonstrates that
captive breeding does not benefit local people in exporting states, and
therefore does little to reduce the demand for wild birds.216 A successful
209. See Groom, supra note 208, at 395.
210. See id. at 393-94. The Sun Valley Wildlife Conservancy in Zimbabwe is a perfect example of
tourism that benefits local people. See supra text accompanying notes 164-67.
211. See Groom, supra note 208, at 394.
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213. See id. at 169. In fact, many of Africa’s national parks operate at economic losses each year
and require government subsidization. See id.
214. Smith, supra note 99, at 455. Captive breeding already is responsible for supplying
commercial quantities of several larger parrot species. See BOLZE, supra note 85, at 16.
215. See BOLZE, supra note 85, at 16.
216. See id.
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captive breeding program must involve the local people of exporting nations.
In addition, captive breeding does nothing to protect forest bird habitat, and
thus must be part of a larger scheme that includes sustainable harvesting
programs like those in Suriname.217 Maintaining birds in captivity, however,
does play an important role in the re-introduction of birds into the wild.218
V. CONCLUSION
Sustainable use programs provide the framework for the most innovative
and effective wildlife conservation of the future. If people are to embrace
protecting the world’s biological diversity, they must have an incentive to do
so. Fundamental to the decision to conserve wildlife is the opportunity to
benefit from maintaining wildlife in its natural form. Maintaining species and
habitat solely for their ecological and aesthetic value certainly is a noble
aspiration, but the world’s burgeoning population needs much more of an
incentive to protect its biological heritage. No amount of government
funding, subsidization, or education can halt humankind’s natural tendency
to exploit the objects of its environment. Sustainable use management,
however, can reduce this exploitation to levels at which natural resources are
consumed “at a rate within their capacity for renewal.”219 At sustainable
levels of consumption, both wildlife and people benefit from trade. Granting
people an economic stake in wildlife provides the best incentive for careful
stewardship of species and habitats.
It is uncertain whether CITES will fully embrace sustainable use
alternatives to its trade ban. The developments at the 1997 Conference of the
Parties are encouraging, but much greater change is needed for the future.
The Convention must shift its focus away from the rigid and ineffectual trade
ban, and concentrate on ways in which trade can work to the advantage of
wildlife and people. Sustainable use management is the prescription for
ensuring the continued vitality of species, habitat, and humanity.
Jay E. Carey
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